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                                                            Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide new empirical evidence about the determinants of per 
capita income in African countries, with particular attention to the affects of governance 
institutional quality and sub regional integration on income level. We use a sample of 49 
countries from the period 1996-2004 and the Generalized Method of Moments Estimation 
model for dynamic panel, proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The results show that 
African regional groups with better institutions, higher degrees of regional integration 
cooperation, higher rates of investment in human capital and lower rates of population 
growth, show a higher level of per capita income. 
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1.0 Introduction   
 
One of the main concerns of economists has been that of analyzing the factors that 
determine the economic growth of countries and explaining the differences in per capita 
income between them. The literature on this has been abundant but the empirical research 
has only been relatively successful at showing what is behind the growth processes and 
the inequalities observed. For this reason, more and more explanatory variables have 
been incorporated into growth models until, at the end of the 20th century, institutional 
factors were included, complementing the more traditional variables, such as labor, 
physical and human capital and technology, used in the neoclassical and endogenous 
growth models. 
This inclusion of institutional variables has its theoretical basis in North (1990) who 
proposed that property rights were the key to permitting resources to be channelled 
towards investment and taking them away from unproductive activities like rent-seeking. 
The indirect effect of promoting growth through higher investment is complemented, 
according to North, by a direct effect that is explained by the changes in the total factor 
productivity in a context of greater efficiency derived from the reduction of positive 
transaction costs. On the basis of this perception, the “new growth theory” has identified a 
series of obstacles to growth such as judicial insecurity in property rights, the inefficiency 
of bureaucracy and of the legal system, political instability, and corruption.  
As far as empirical work, a series of circumstances have favoured the integration of 
institutional factors in the explanations of economic growth. On the one hand, the studies 
of Easterly and Levine (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999), among others, have reopened 
the debate by pointing out that a significant fraction of the process of economic growth due 
to changes in total factor productivity, so that the arguments focused on the factors 
accumulation are unsatisfactory in explaining this process. Easterly and Levine (1997) 
conclude that political instability has a negative correlation with the significant and long-
term economic growth in African countries. Hall and Jones (1999), using a more global 
sample of countries, point out that differences in the accumulation of physical and human 
capital, productivity and hence in output per worker across countries, is given by the 
differences in the institutional framework. 
On the other hand, in recent years there has been a major development of institutional 
indicators by risk agencies, multilateral agencies, research centres and other Non-
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Governmental Organizations, which has helped demonstrate convincingly causality 
relations between institutional quality and economic development. Until the nineties the 
availability of indicators was very limited, since most of the institutional dimensions were 
considered non-quantifiable. Thus tending empirical work to emphasize those elements is 
easy to quantify, such as labour and capital, to the detriment of institutional aspects. 
Thus, in recent years, the incorporation of institutions into growth models has become a 
habitual practice among researchers (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Barro, 1996; 
Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Stroup, 2007). Most of them 
have found a positive and significant effect of institutional quality on economic growth.  
Along with the above study of Easterly and Levine (1997), it should be noted that other 
more recent studies have also focused their attention on the impact that institutions exert 
on the growth of Africa. Thus, Fosu (2001) concluded that political instability adversely 
affects the economic growth of sub-Saharan Africa, through the negative impact that has 
on the marginal product of capital. Easterly and Levine (2003) found, from a sample of 72 
former colonies, a strong positive impact of institutional development on the level of per 
capita income. Faruk et al. (2006), focusing their study in the Middle East and North Africa, 
conclude that institutional quality encourages a positive and significant private investment. 
Fosu (2008) finds that democracy exhibits in Africa U-shape relationships with GDP 
growth. 
Nowadays governance institutional quality might be one of the most significant 
determinants of differences in the economic performances across countries especially in 
continents such as Africa in which many observers have pointed out that the 
fragmentations of their political economy, including their institution of governances, as one 
of the main weaknesses for the continent to be able to afford their development strategies. 
A large majority of their population, which are in the rural areas, continue to mainly follow  
traditional institutions while the post-colonial statesessentially emulate western institutions 
of governance, which is  often contrary to the traditional African cultural values. The 
fragmentation of the institutions of governance, along with economic and social 
fragmentation, has contributed to Africa’s crisis of state-building, governance and 
economic development. Institutional development is now recognized as an integral part of 
successful developmental strategies and from the experiences of the European Union it is 
evident that it is important for regional integration. This paper attempts to empirically 
investigate the link between governance institutional quality and sub regional integration 
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on income level, for the period spanning from 1996-2004 on groups of 49 African 
countries.  
 
2.0 The African Economic Growth Pattern. 
After a long period of economic stagnation and collapse that started in the mid ‘70s, the 
African economies seem to have turned the page during the last decade (1996-2006). The 
economic performance shows that African economies are growing at the same rate as  
other world economies , with a 2.2% of annual  average growth. During this decade  
(1996- 2006), the average  annual GDP  growth rate  has been  more than 5%, having a 
significant rise in the real income per capita  of  2%, after a prolonged period of decline  
between 1975-1995  (see table 5). Some African economies have started to emerge as 
high performers, since the late 1990s, 14 African countries have obtained a GDP growth 
rate of more than 5 % per year, and almost 20 countries are currently achieving more than 
5% GDP growth (Busari et al, 2008).  
The disappointing growth rate of African countries was unexpected by many economists 
(Easterly and Levine 1997), because around the early ‘60s, when many African countries 
obtained their independence, their growth rate was higher than that of many other 
developing nations - especially their Asian counterparts, as evidenced by the World Bank 
(1990). The relative growth collapse of 1975-1994 was a shock to many observers, 
because during the first decade of post-independence many African countries were 
growing consistently. Some of them indicated that they could have a growth rate of 7% 
annually (Enke, 1963 and Kamarck, 1967). When we look acutely at the situation of 
African countries and other developing regions, it’s unbelievable that there has been such 
a radical change witnessed by Africa in losing position compared to other developing 
regions.  
There are some characteristics that differentiate the African growth record.  Most African 
countries’ growth has been more episodic than in other developing regions, with numerous 
periods of growth acceleration over the last 30 years, but also with a comparable number 
of some growth collapses (Arbache and Page, 2007). Ten African countries3 have had 
growth disasters, because during the period 1965-04 they obtained an average growth 
                                                          
3
 Central African Republic -0,9 percent, Congo Dem. -3,3 percent, Cote d’lvoire -0,4 percent, Liberia -4,3 percent, Madagascar -1,3 
percent, Niger -2 percent, Sierra Leone -1,4 percent, Togo -0,2 percent, Zambia -1,5 percent and Zimbabwe -0,1 percent 
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rate below 0 percent. Among these countries, Cote d’lvoire is a model case for the 
collapse that the continent experienced. In 1965 it was considered  an example for 
development in Africa and had the highest per capita income in 1965,  it has now 
regressed due to political instability, which is the main characteristic of these disastrous 
growth performances. Out of the ten countries, six were affected by wars of different 
nature, while the others, although generally peaceful, are well known for persistently poor 
economic policies because of poor macroeconomic environments and socialism (Collier 
and Gunning, 1999). 
In 1965, the ten countries with the highest GDP per capita were natural resource4 and oil 
producing countries. This trend persists up until now with most of these countries still 
having the highest per capita income - with the exception of Liberia and Cote d’lvoire that 
can be considered as having negative growth. (growth collapses is not good grammar)i5 
.We find that only six nations have growth rates above 2 percent and they are located  in 
the Northern and Southern  extremities of the continent6 .The best economic performance 
in Africa is Botswana, despite the fact that it had the lowest GDP per capita in 1965 
(255US$), with an annual average growth rate above 5 percent for four decades. It’s 
income per capita has increased by 14.3 times. Tunisia can also be consider as one of the 
continent’s growth successes, with an annual growth rate of 3 percent, it saw its GDP per 
capita increasing a lot from 730 to 2336 dollars, considering that it is not a natural resource  
country. Whilst in the groups of countries with a growth rate of GDP per capita  between 2 
and 0 percent, we find  17 countries that  can be considered as growth stagnations7. Some 
of them had a period of accelerated growth, but even though it was the period of their 
take–off, it lasted only for a short amount of time. 
3.0 Regional Economic Integration in Africa 
 In Africa, Regional integration has been a very important process in the development of 
the continent, this started in the early 20th century. The evolution can be divided into 
various stages, with two significant parts. One of the early stages had a strong political 
motivation, characterized by the struggle for liberation from the colonization and research 
                                                          
4
 Resource   countries as   South Africa, Liberia ,Seychelles  Gabon, Algeria, Republic of Congo, and Cote d’lvoire. 
5
  Liberia that has a percentage change of -81.5 while Cote d’lvoire  had a decline of -15 of their  GDP per capita (1965-2004), 
6
 Botswana, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Seychelles and Lesotho 
7
 Algeria (1973-1985), Cameroon (1977-1987), Kenya (1965-1976) and South Africa (1960-1974). 
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of the continent identity: “Pan Africanism”8.  The most recent stage culminated with the 
signing of the Abuja Treaty in 1991 establishing the creation of the African Economic 
Community with the main focus on economic integration and cooperation, in order to foster 
growth and the development of the continent. 
After the Second World War, Africa was built of small states which were economically 
insignificant. The fragmentation9 of Africa has been mentioned as one of the constraints to 
development (Easterly and Levine, 1997 and Sach and Warner, 1998). The community of 
regional integration is seen as a solution for the continent. If developed countries with 
large economics, like Germany, Japan and the United States, find it important to engage in 
regional integration and a collective security arrangement, then the case of Africa’s 
underdeveloped, mini economies must be compelling, indeed, in order to survive. This 
unfolding mega trend of the world system has transformed the African cooperation from a 
regional necessity into an imperative of the continent10. The spread of regionalism on a 
global scale indicates clearly that individual states outside the major economic blocks will 
find themselves marginalized. The European Economic integration was created for 
strength and prosperity, while Africa needs it for survival. Without integration Africa cannot 
face the many challenges posed by the process of globalization, and it cannot seize the 
opportunity to reduce its weaknesses or even overcome them completely, in order to 
become a possible player within the current globalised world. It is now widely recognized 
that regional integration and cooperation will have to play a crucial role to improve the 
economic outlook in Africa (European Commission, 1999). Despite the fact that they 
recognized the failure affecting regional integration in Africa, they believed that a well-
designed and implemented regionalism would contribute significantly and positively to the 
development of the continent and that it would follow the tendency of the world going 
toward the creation of regional blocks.  
African leader and the continent important Economic  institution(United Nation Economic 
Commission for Africa)  had  recognize the importance  regional integration  and choosing 
it  as one of their main development strategy.   Many African countries are now members 
of one or more sub-regional groups, which have the objective of promoting economic 
cooperation, integration and coordination among member countries. So far, the African 
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 it distinguishes regional integration in Africa from other regions in the developing world (McCarthy, 1995) 
9
 Africa has 53 small economies with an average gross domestic product, which is equal to that of Belgium or to 50% of that of Spain, as indicated by 
the World Bank.  
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Economic Community (AEC) has established direct working relations with the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West African region and with the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the central region. In the 
Southern African region the AEC has been dealing with the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and in East Africa with the East African Community (EAC), as well as 
with the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). In North Africa there is 
the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), which for now has no direct contact with the AEC. Apart 
from these regional economic communities (RECs) there are other groupings like the 
Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) and the Customs and Economic 
Union of Central Africa (UDEAC); all of them are engaged in the promotion of integration. 
Each organization was already existing and operating when the AEC treaty was signed in 
Abuja in June 1991. 
The problem of multiple memberships of regional integration groups is a particular feature 
of African regionalism, as indicated by the African Economic Commission 1999; 95% of 
the African countries are members of more than two regional communities. It’s in the 
nature of regionalism that there are conflicting policies concerning the treatment of third 
countries and sometimes, different regulations and technical standards are governing the 
import of the same commodity from different sources. The overlapping memberships in the 
different regional groupings and hence at a different commitment, have resulted in a 
duplication of effort and in occasional and inconsistent aims in African regional integration 
initiatives (Masson and Pattillo, 2004). Despite that, most of these regional economic 
communities seem less satisfactory in achieving their own objectives, as pointed out by 
Johnson, 1995 and Lyakurwa, 1997, but there have been progresses which cannot be 
neglected, as those that some of the RECs have made in trade liberalization and 
facilitation (COMESA), the free movement of people (ECOWAS), in infrastructure (SADC), 
peace and security (ECOWAS and SADC).  
 
4.0 Empirical application and data 
To develop the empirical application, first we built an aggregate index of institutional 
quality, using the statistical procedure “factor analysis”. Specifically, the methodology has 
been “principal component”, which aims to find the combinations of p variable X1, X2 ,..., 
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 This encouragement for creating an integrated block came from institutions of influence like the European Commission: “Regionalism is a must for 
Africa.”  
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Xp, to build rates Z1, Z2 ,.... ZP, who are incorrelates. The aim is that the largest possible 
proportion of the original p Xi variable can be described with fewer major components Zi. 
The aggregate indicator constructed has the advantage of collecting the effect of the 
different dimensions included in the concept of institutional quality. 
To elaborate the aggregate index of institutional quality, we have used the Worldwide 
Governance Research Indicators of Kaufmann et al. (2007). These indicators are 
measured in units that range from –2.5 to 2.5, and they describe the following:  
• “Voice and Accountability” measures various aspects of the political process, civil 
liberties and political rights.  
• “Political Stability and Absence of Violence” measures perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilised by unconstitutional means.  
• “Government Effectiveness” combines perceptions of the quality of public service 
provision and bureaucracy, the independence of the civil service from political 
pressure, and the credibility of the government's commitment. 
• “Regulatory Quality” includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the 
burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and 
business development.  
• “Rule of Law” measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of both violent and 
non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the 
enforceability of contracts.  
• “Control of Corruption” measures perceptions about the exercise of public power for 
private gain.  
As regards to the choice of indicators employees have chosen the World Bank since its 
careful methodology aggregation as well as publications that accompany such indicators 
explaining in detail its construction and sources of origin, are a guarantee of reliability11. 
Once developed the index, we have used as main database World Development 
Indicators (2007), data from La Porta et al. (1999) and Easterly and Levine (1997).  
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We propose the following empirical model to identify those factors that explain the level of 
per capita income that is currently present in the countries of the African continent: 
 
GDPpc = α + β1* Lag. GDPpc. + β2* School + β3* Pop. grow + β4* Investment + 
 β5* IQ + β6*Dum.reg + µ 
This is a general formulation of the neoclassical model augmented with institutions and 
sub-regional dummies. GDPpc is the per capita GDP. Lag. GDPpc is the lagged GDP. 
School is the rate of secondary school enrolment as proxy of investment in human capital. 
Pop-grow is the annual growth of the population. Investment is the gross fixed capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP, as proxy of investment in physical capital. IQ is 
institutional quality using as proxies both the aggregate indicator as different individual 
dimensions used in their construction, with the aim of determining the significance and 
explanatory capacity of each of the dimensions of institutional quality. Finally, Dum.reg are 
dummies for the main areas of regional integration in Africa. 
Specifically, the dummies introduced have been the following: (Arab Maghreb Union 
(amu);  Southern African Development Community (sadc);  Common Market For Eastern 
And Southern Africa (comesa);  The Economic Community of West African States 
(ecowas); Central African Economic And Monetary Community (cemac);  West African 
Economic And Monetary Union (uemoa); (vii) Economic Community Of Central African 
States (eccas). All variables are expressed in logarithms, except IQ and regional dummies. 
The relationship between institutional quality and economic growth can present inverse 
causality because countries with higher per capita incomes can devote more resources to 
create and sustain more efficient institutions. Furthermore, aspects of institutional quality, 
such as political stability or liberties, are affected by income levels. To eliminate this 
problem of endogeneity while, at the same time, control the unobserved heterogeneity, we 
employ the Generalized Method of Moments Estimation models for dynamic panel, 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), for a sample of 49 countries and a temporary 
period of 9 years (1996-2004). Controlling the endogeneity succeeds in using "internal 
instruments", i.e. lagged values of the explanatory variables. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
11
 These indicators have been widely used in empirical papers on growth and institutional quality (Easterly and Levine, 
2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; Rigobon y Rodrik, 2005; Faruk et. al, 2006, among others). 
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5.0 Results and  Conclusions 
The estimation of the model gives the following results, shown in tables 1 to 4.Firstly, 
institutional quality is a fundamental factor in explaining the economic growth of African 
countries. Thus, both the overall index and the different individual dimensions of 
institutional quality, with the exception of “Voice and Accountability”, show a highly 
significant and positive coefficient (table 1 and 2). Moreover the explanatory capacity of 
the model is high, with an adjusted R2 that exceeds in all estimates the 81%. 
With respect to the result for “Voice and Accountability”, that is not robust to the method of 
estimation, it is worth noting that democracy is the institutional aspect that has generated 
major discrepancies. Thus, the available empirical studies do not reach a consensus about 
the role that democracy plays in growth, highlighting the conflict between costs and 
benefits identified by the theoretical literature12 (Scully, 1988; Barro 1996; Rodrik, 1999; 
and Rigobon Rodrik, 2005; Fosu, 2008). 
Secondly, if regional economic integration promotes economic growth in African countries. 
Thus, the dummies introduced to the countries belonging to the Arab Maghreb Union 
(amu) and Central African Economic and Monetary Community (cemac), show a highly 
significant and positive coefficient (table 3 and 4) and the explanatory power of the model 
improves so that the adjusted R2 is located at 85% (table 3, model 10). 
As mentioned earlier, countries belonging to the Arab Maghreb Union signed a trade 
agreement in 1989 with the goal of achieving political and economic unity in North Africa, 
promoting economic and cultural cooperation. It aims to be a precursor of North Africa 
Common Market. For its part, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community is 
an organization of states of Central Africa which was established to promote economic 
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 We find diverse theoretical positions. The “Conflict Perspective” (Huntigton, 1968; Olson, 1982) considers that 
democracy hinders economic growth because of the appearance of certain pressure groups which make it difficult to 
carry out some reforms and policies that are necessary for economic growth. The “Comparability Perspective” 
(Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Clague et al. 1996) states that only a democratic system can give complete credibility 
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integration among countries sharing a common currency, the CFA franc. It is the 
successor of the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa, completely replaced in 
1999. Its objectives are the promotion of trade, the establishment of a real common 
market, and greater solidarity among peoples. Its member countries share structure 
financial, regulatory and legal, and maintains a common external tariff on imports from 
third countries of CEMAC. 
Thirdly, investment in human capital and population growth also help to explain the 
different levels of per capita income of these countries (tables 1 to 4). Thus, those 
countries with higher rates of enrolment in secondary education and lower population 
growth, have higher levels of per capita income. Finally, the sensitivity analysis carried out 
shows that the significance of the variable investment in physical capital disappears in a 
number of estimates when in the model is introduced the index of institutional quality, due 
to the multicollineality between these two variables, with a correlation exceeding 40 %. 
 5.1 Conclusions 
In this paper, evidence is presented on the determinant of growth processes in African 
countries, using a sample of 49 countries for the period 1996-2004.The empirical 
application developed has shown that those African countries with better institutions, a 
high degree of regional economic integration, higher rates of investment in human capital 
and lower rates of population growth present a higher level of per capita income.  
These conclusions have important implications for the agenda of institutional reform to 
promote growth and make development aid more effective. The old consensus that the 
natural way to overcome underdevelopment was to offer sufficient financial flows to the 
least favoured countries seems to have broken down, and institutional questions are being 
given an increasingly important role. Donor agencies have concluded that development 
assistance is more effective in countries with good institutional quality. Increasingly, 
international financial institutions and some bilateral donor agencies, subscribing to 
evidence-based policy and decision-making, explicitly tie aid transfers to governance 
outcomes (World Bank, 2007). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
to property rights protection policies, key to economic development. The “Skeptical Perspective” (Hirschman, 1994) 
considers that political freedom alone does not guarantee growth.  
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Furthermore, Kauffmann (2006) points out that good governance and the control of 
corruption are not a luxury that only rich countries can afford. Poor countries, especially 
those in Africa, can and must improve their governance and reduce corruption in order to 
complement aid inflows (Aixalá y Fabro, 2008). 
Similarly, health and education policies to improve the human capital endowment, as well 
as policies of birth control, can support the growth of African countries. 
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Table 1: Per capita income and institutional quality (global index and individual indicators) [OLS] 
 
OLS Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 
Variable dependent: GDPpc             
Lag. GDPpc 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School 0.449*** 0.487*** 0.468*** 0.377*** 0.531*** 0.460*** 0.478*** 
  (0.111) (0.113) (0.113) (0.110) (0.110) (0.113) (0.111) 
Pop-grow -0.132*** -0.139*** -0.141*** -0.120*** -0.137*** -0.139*** -0.145*** 
  (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Investment 0.200** 0.287*** 0.257*** 0.160** 0.313*** 0.233*** 0.221*** 
  (0.079) (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.071) (0.081) (0.077) 
Index IQ 0.098***             
  (0.028)             
Voice 
  0.066           
  
  (0.047)           
Pol. stability 
    0.089**         
  
    (0.040)         
Gov. Effectiveness 
      0.325***       
  
      (0.064)       
Reg. Quality 
        0.111***     
  
        (0.029)     
Rule of Law 
          0.154**   
  
          (0.064)   
Control corruption 
            0.220*** 
  
            (0.066) 
Constant 3.533*** 3.007*** 3.202*** 4.001*** 2.869*** 3.356*** 3.352*** 
  (0.542) (0.528) (0.537) (0.542) (0.501) (0.553) (0.527) 
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 
R-squared 0,822 0,814 0,817 0,831 0,824 0,817 0,821 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
 
 
 16 
Table 2: Per capita income and institutional quality (global index and individual indicators) [GMM] 
GMM Dynamic estimation Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 
Variable dependent: GDPpc      
Lag. GDPpc 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School 0.514* 0.594** 0.458* 0.424* 0.699** 0.483* 0.435* 
  (0.274) (0.269) (0.246) (0.253) (0.289) (0.263) (0.262) 
Pop-grow -0.142** -0.133** -0.132 -0.131** -0.160** -0.152** -0.180*** 
  (0.063) (0.064) (0.086) (0.052) (0.065) (0.062) (0.068) 
Investment 0,115 0,177 0.025 0,134 0.436*** 0,150 0,168 
  (0.195) (0.175) (0.151) (0.177) (0.128) (0.209) (0.216) 
Index IQ 0.178**       
  (0.078)       
Voice 
 0.321*      
  
 (0.173)      
Pol. stability 
  0.434**     
  
  (0.218)     
Gov. Effectiveness 
   0.423***    
  
   (0.155)    
Reg. Quality 
    0.308**   
  
    (0.120)   
Rule of Law 
     0.345**  
  
     (0.153)  
Control corruption 
      0.340** 
 
      (0.164) 
Constant 3.524*** 2.825*** 4.167*** 3.793*** 2.211* 3.503*** 3.692*** 
 (-1.173) (-1.076) (-1.457) (-1.049) (-1.189) (0.964) (-1.362) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Number of ID 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Instruments 45 45 26 45 45 45 36 
Arellano-Bond Test (AR2) 0,32 0,74 0,42 0,54 0,9 0,43 0,32 
Hansen test 0,36 0,55 0,58 0,41 0,26 0,62 0,47 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
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Table 3: Per capita income, institutional quality and economic integration [OLS] 
 
OLS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Variable dependent: GDPpc         
Lag. GDPpc 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School 0.496*** 0.449*** 0.403*** 0.466*** 0.498*** 0.456*** 0.438*** 0.446*** 0.442*** 0.384*** 
  (0.113) (0.111) (0.107) (0.114) (0.114) (0.117) (0.108) (0.123) (0.112) (0.103) 
Pop-grow -0.147*** -0.132*** -0.129*** -0.139*** -0.146*** -0.133*** -0.134*** -0.132*** -0.134*** -0.130*** 
  (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) 
Investment 0.322*** 0.200** 0.207*** 0.197** 0.175** 0.202** 0,072 0.199** 0.194** 0.092 
  (0.073) (0.079) (0.076) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.082) (0.080) (0.080) (0.077) 
Index IQ 
 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.103*** 0.088*** 0.095*** 0.139*** 0.098*** 0.105*** 0.145*** 
 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.028) 
amu 
  0.435***       0.498*** 
 
  (0.096)       (0.093) 
sadc 
   -0.059       
 
   (0.082)       
comesa 
    -0.130*      
 
    (0.069)      
ecowas 
     0.016     
 
     (0.077)     
cemac 
      0.361***   0.437*** 
 
      (0.100)   (0.096) 
uemoa 
       -0.005   
 
       (0.092)   
eccas 
        0.045  
 
        (0.084)  
Constant 2.842*** 3.533*** 3.673*** 3.501*** 3.456*** 3.487*** 3.900*** 3.549*** 3.589*** 4.136*** 
 (0.515) (0.542) (0.522) (0.544) (0.541) (0.586) (0.538) (0.615) (0.553) (0.512) 
Observations 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 
R-squared 0,810 0,822 0,826 0,822 0,824 0,822 0,831 0,822 0,822 0,849 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
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Table 4: Per capita income, institutional quality and economic integration [GMM] 
 
GMM Dynamic estimation Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 
Variable dependent: GDPpc    
Lag. GDPpc 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School 0.557* 0.514* 0.437* 0.482** 0,315* 
  (0.299) (0.274) (0.255) (0.240) (0.326) 
Pop-grow -0.184*** -0.142** -0.164* -0.101 -0.165*** 
  (0.069) (0.063) (0.098) (0.073) (0.062) 
Investment 0.436*** 0,115 -0.154 0.024 0.091 
  (0.159) (0.195) (0.203) (0.152) (0.195) 
Index IQ 
 0.178** 0.355** 0.247** 0.210** 
 
 (0.078) (0.140) (0.105) (0.105) 
Cemac 
  0.695*  0.634** 
 
  (0.376)  (0.309) 
Amu 
   0.641** 0.635*** 
 
   (0.254) (0.203) 
Constant 2.358** 3.524*** 5.104*** 4.053*** 4.063*** 
 (-1.157) (-1.173) (-1.390) (-1.169) (-1.420) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 
Number of ID 46 46 46 46 46 
Instruments 33 45 26 26 39 
Arellano-Bond Test (AR2) 0,83 0,32 0,26 0,25 0,83 
Hansen test 0,64 0,36 0,29 0,49 0,58 
 
Standard errors in parentheses: 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
                                *ceman; central africa monetary  
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Table  5; GDP PER CAPITA OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND THEIR SUB REGIONAL GROUPES 1965-2004 
Countries GDP PER CAPITA  AVERAGE GROWTH OF GDP PER CAPITA 
 1965 2004 1965-1974 1975-1994 1995-2004 1965-2004 
Algeria 1183 1982 3,08% 0,09% 2,22% 1,32% 
Egypt. 548 1615 0,58% 3,80% 2,68% 2,77% 
Morocco 618 1349 2,69% 1,90% 1,57% 2,00% 
Tunisia 730 2336 4,34% 2,10% 3,52% 2,98% 
Mauritania 340 437 1,39% -0,29% 1,86% 0,65% 
UMA 684 1544 2,41% 1,52% 2,37% 2,09% 
Cameroon 471 662 0,69% 0,24% 2,31% 0,88% 
Central African Rep. 326 225 0,76% -1,92% -0,54% -0,95% 
Chad 235 257 -1,93% -0,44% 3,51% 0,23% 
Congo, Rep. 638 940 3,17% 0,63% -0,24% 0,99% 
Gabon 2380 3860 8,36% -1,28% -0,12% 1,24% 
CEMAC 810 1189 2,21% -0,55% 0,98% 0,98% 
Gambia 266 337 0,81% -3,29% 5,23% 0,61% 
Ghana 270 278 0,68% 0,59% 3,53% 0,08% 
Nigeria 322 402 3,50% -2,61% 3,63% 0,56% 
Sierra Leone 266 156 1,54% -1,94% 2,98% -1,37% 
Burkina Faso 164 248 0,83% -1,81% 0,62% 1,06% 
Benin 288 328 0,42% 0,69% -0,55% 0,33% 
Cote d'Ivoire 676 574 3,44% -2,14% 0,12% -0,42% 
Guinea-Bissau 178 137 1,84% -0,04% 1,18% -0,64% 
Liberia 699 130 1,94% -25,45% 1,81% -4,32% 
Mali 187 237 -0,77% -1,77% -0,84% 0,62% 
Niger 347 156 -4,33% 0,72% -2,47% -2,05% 
Senegal 467 461 -1,28% 0,22% 3,61% -0,03% 
Togo 268 244 1,66% 11,36% 0,37% -0,24% 
ECOWAS 338 284 0,24% -0,94% 1,68% -0,66% 
Botswana 255 3668 10,96% 6,18% 4,46% 6,84% 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 317 88 0,91% -5,28% -3,11% -3,30% 
Lesotho 146 540 5,20% 3,02% 2,33% 3,35% 
Malawi 109 153 3,27% -0,84% 2,13% 0,87% 
Seychelles 2485 6656 3,15% 3,15% 0,71% 2,53% 
Zambia 604 336 -1,02% -2,86% 0,77% -1,50% 
Zimbabwe 472 457 4,23% -0,58% -2,97% -0,08% 
South Africa 2690 3312 2,38% -0,64% 1,21% 0,53% 
SADC 885 1901 3,01% 1,71% 1,51% 1,96% 
Mali 187 237 -0,77% -0,04% 2,77% 0,62% 
Niger 347 156 -4,33% -1,97% -0,15% -1,98% 
Senegal 467 461 -1,28% -0,48% 1,98% -0,03% 
Togo 268 244 1,66% -1,58% 0,71% -0,43% 
Burkina Faso 164 248 0,83% 0,88% 1,63% 0,97% 
Benin 288 328 0,42% -0,38% 1,67% 0,31% 
Cote d'Ivoire 676 574 3,44% -2,32% -0,09% -0,86% 
Guinea-Bissau 178 137 1,84% 0,07% -2,80% -0,64% 
UEMOA 322 298 -0,16% -1,17% 1,11% -0,35% 
 
Cameroon 
 
471 
 
662 
 
0,69% 
 
0,24% 
 
2,31% 
 
0,88% 
Central African  326 225 0,76% -1,92% -0,54% -0,95% 
Chad 235 257 -1,93% -0,44% 3,51% 0,23% 
Congo, Rep. 638 940 3,17% 0,63% -0,24% 0,99% 
Gabon 2380 3860 8,36% -1,28% -0,12% 1,24% 
Rwanda 187 250 1,55% -1,73% 4,97% 0,74% 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 317 88 0,91% -5,28% -3,11% -3,30% 
Burundi 91 105 2,75% 0,43% -1,93% 0,36% 
ECCAS 581 798 5,51% -1,02% 0,27% 0,82% 
Rwanda 186 249 0,86% 0,13% 1,98% 0,74% 
Congo, Rep 317 87 0,00% -4,98% -3,20% -3,30% 
Burundi 91 104 2,42% 0,03% -1,18% 0,36% 
Malawi 109 152 3,22% -0,28% 0,80% 0,87% 
Seychelles 2485 6655 2,96% 2,96% 1,09% 2,53% 
Zambia 604 336 -1,50% -2,84% 1,45% -1,50% 
Zimbabwe 471 456 3,28% -0,40% -3,12% -0,08% 
Egypt 547 1614 1,16% 3,62% 2,68% 2,77% 
Sudan 278 433 0,25% 0,34% 3,88% 1,13% 
Swaziland 722 1356 6,28% 1,41% 0,38% 1,85% 
Madagascar 366 228 -0,02% -2,32% -0,07% -1,21% 
Kenya 261 426 3,90% 0,42% 0,18% 1,26% 
COMESA 537 1009 1,90% -0,16% 0,41% 0,45% 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDEX OF THE  INSTITUTIONIAL QUALITY OF 
GOVERNANCE AND INCOME PER CAPITA OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES. 
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The pattern of distribution of the GDP per capita during the last decade 
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